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Exploring (Social) Class in the Classroom:
The Case of Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
Miriam A. Cherry*
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon (the "Lucy Case")'
presents a rich teaching vehicle for the first year of contracts for
multiple reasons. Another participant in this symposium has
discussed the Lucy Case to laud its value in teaching fact analy-
sis or issue spotting.2 Others have commented upon the case for
its doctrinal utility in explaining the concepts of illusory con-
tracts, exclusive dealing and best efforts. 3 The historical back-
ground,4 the opinions of Benjamin Cardozo 5 and the opportunity
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Law; B.A., 1996, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1999, Harvard Law School. I wish to
acknowledge Jim Fishman, Monroe Freedman, Deborah Post, Frank Snyder, Celia
Taylor, Deborah Zalesne and the other participants in the Pace University School
of Law conference for their input and thoughts on this topic. Thanks to Jerry
Caplan and Jarrod Wong for their insightful comments. Additional thanks to D.
James Bjorkman and Kelsey Papst for research assistance, and to the editors of
the Pace Law Review for their hard work.
1. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
2. See Deborah Zalesne, Integrating Academic Skills into First Year Curric-
ula: Using Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon to Teach the Role of Facts in Legal
Reasoning, 28 PACE L. REV. 271 (2008).
3. Peter Linzer, "Implied," "Inferred," and "Imposed": Default Rules and Adhe-
sion Contract - The Need for Radical Surgery, 28 PACE L. REV. 195 (2008); Nicholas
R. Weiskopf; Wood v. Lucy: The Overlap Between Interpretation and Gap-Filling
to Achieve Minimum Decencies, 28 PACE L. REV. 219 (2008).
4. Meredith R. Miller, A Picture of the New York Court of Appeals at the Time
of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 357 (2008); see also Walter F.
Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C.L. REV. 415
(1988).
5. Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of
Noninterventionism, 28 PACE L. REV. 315 (2008); Monroe H. Freedman, Cardozo's
Opinion in Lady Lucy's Case: "Formative Unconscionability," Impracticality and
Judicial Abuse, 28 PACE L. REV. 395 (2008); see also, e.g., Curtis Bridgeman, Alle-
gheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and Formalism in Context, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 149 (2005); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Teaching Law through
Contracts and Cardozo, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1511 (2000); Dan Simon, The Double-
Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo, 79 OR. L. REV. 1033
(2000).
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to introduce feminist jurisprudence 6 and law and economics
concepts 7 into the first year course are also fertile ground for
discussion. Knowing that others would focus on these themes,
however, I chose to examine the role of social class in the Lucy
Case, the contracts course and in the classroom more generally.
Other scholars have discussed the topic of social class in
law schools, most typically concentrating on diversity issues, or
how socioeconomic class interacts with race, gender and other
factors to impact a law student's learning experience." In this
essay, I intend to use the Lucy Case to situate social class dis-
cussions around the contracts course. Professor Jeffrey Harri-
son engendered this type of inquiry when he examined
contracts through a socioeconomics lens-socioeconomics being
a separate discipline that draws from insights in economics, bi-
ology, sociology and other areas. 9 My goal in examining social
6. See, e.g., Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern
Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1029 (1992).
7. Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street Associ-
ates Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 120 HARv. L. REV. 1187, 1195 (2007) (analyzing, as
part of the symposium, Judge Posner's contributions to contracts jurisprudence);
Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEx. L.
REV. 1581, 1584-85 (2005) (discussing law and economics view of gap filling rules).
8. See, e.g., Timothy T. Clydesdale, A Forked River Runs Through Law School:
Toward Understanding Race, Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Per-
formance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW & Soc. INQ. 711, 724-52 (2004) (exploring these
factors in law school performance and beyond); William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT
Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences In Educational Attainment?: A
Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1104-06
(2001); Albert Y. Muratsuchi, Race, Class, and UCLA School of Law Admissions,
1967-1994, 16 CHICANo-LATINO L. REV. 90 (1995) (exploring these factors in the
context of one particular law school).
9. It should be noted that a socioeconomic analysis attempts to shed light on
the reasons that individuals enter into transactions. While there are many aspects
of socioeconomics that overlap with social class (also known as socio-economic sta-
tus), and although the two terms are etymologically similar, these are two distinct
concepts. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Teaching Contracts from a Socioeconomic Perspec-
tive, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1233 (2000) [hereinafter Harrison, Teaching from a Socio-
economic Perspective]. Socioeconomics is based in several disciplines-economics,
biology, sociology-and looks at the preferences and assumptions that drive indi-
viduals to act in ways that may not be completely "rational" as the standard law
and economics model would posit. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, 49
J. LEGAL EDUC. 224, 225 (1999) [hereinafter Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics].
At the same time, Professor Harrison has adopted a purely class-based analysis in
some of this other work. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Confess'n the Blues: Some Thoughts
on Class Bias in Law School Hiring, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119 (1992) (discussing
classism in the context of law professor hiring).
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class issues in the contracts class is twofold: first, to open more
inquiry and discussion among first year law students into the
distributional nature of contract law, and second, for the stu-
dents to think about issues of economic stratification more criti-
cally. These issues are becoming increasingly more important
as, according to recently published studies, the divide in in-
comes within the United States is at its highest point since the
1920s. 10
Such an inquiry necessarily raises one of contract law's
more enduring (and troubling) questions: is the role of contract
law strictly limited to policing the bargains that private individ-
uals have made, regardless of how much they reinforce existing
inequality or exacerbate inequality in bargaining power? If the
answer to this question is "yes," in a normative sense, should
that be so? Might the way that we teach contracts (if we do so
with a focus on social class) allow for transformative thought
even if one concludes that contract law itself is not particularly
transformative?
I. Social Class in the Lucy Case
The facts and holding of the Lucy Case are explored in
other papers or talks that are a part of this symposium, so I will
not rehearse the dispute at length. Suffice it to say that Wood
was to have the exclusive right to place Lucy's name on fashion
designs, but that Lucy continued to place endorsements regard-
less of their deal.'1 Lucy attempted to escape enforcement of
the contract on the theory that Wood's promise was illusory, i.e.
that Wood had not actually promised to "do" anything.12 The
court, per Justice Cardozo, disagreed, holding that because
Wood had to exert "reasonable efforts" in performing the exclu-
sive dealing contract, he and Lucy had entered into a contract
that was supported by consideration. 13
10. See Greg Ip, Income Inequality Gap Widens, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2007, at
A2.
11. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
12. Id.
13. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law As an Iterative Process:
A Preliminary Inquiry, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 776 (2006) (The Lucy Case
arose in a period marking the transition from simple markets characterized
by face-to-face dealings and relative stability to complex commercial society,
impersonal economic exchange and greater uncertainty and market volatil-
3
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In addition to the case itself, my class reads excerpts in
their casebook to discover some of the background on Lucy Lady
Duff-Gordon's life and times.14 Lucy came from a modest-mid-
dle to upper class background, but became a woman of for-
tune-and fame-based on her abilities as a fashion designer
and trendsetter.15 The students also discover her apparent in-
sensitivity to those who drowned in steerage on the Titanic,
while she and her husband escaped in a mostly empty lifeboat.' 6
Justice Cardozo begins his opinion in a derogatory tone when he
claims that the defendant "styles herself 'a creator of fashions"'
and that her "favor helps a sale."17 This rhetorical flourish
could be construed as a statement against the perceived frivol-
ity of fashion, and indeed, Lucy herself. Professor Jeffrey Har-
rison has written that "any effort to turn a vogue into money
does not sound serious; it seems like an effort to make money on
the vanity of others. Judge Cardozo pushes the buttons of that
era by emphasizing the greed and frivolity of Duff-Gordon." 8
Apart from Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon's biography, the sub-
ject matter of the case itself involved a widespread "marketing"
of social class itself through the sale of particular status goods. 19
ity. These changing circumstances both justified and sustained Cardozo's
innovation in Wood declaring that an implied obligation to use reasonable
efforts could furnish consideration for a promise.
Cunningham then contrasts the case with recent decisions by Judge Richard Pos-
ner.) (internal citation omitted); Avery Katz, The Option Element in Contracting,
90 VA. L. REV. 2187, 2193 (2004) (discussing the holding of the Lucy Case); Victor
P. Goldberg, Desperately Seeking Consideration: The Unfortunate Impact of U.C.C.
Section 2-306 on Contract Interpretation, 68 OHIO ST. L. J. 103, 108-13 (1997) (ar-
guing that the code provision goes too far to imply "best efforts" when all that is
needed is a small amount of consideration to prevent the promise from being
illusory).
14. MEREDITH ETHERINGTON-SMITH & JEREMY PILCHER, THE "IT" GIRLS: Lucy,
LADY DUFF-GoRDON, THE COUTURIERE "LuCILE," AND ELINOR GLYN, RoMANTIc Nov-
ELIST XII-XIV, 174-78 (1986) (describing Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon's creative fashions
and her design of costumes for the Ziegfeld showgirls); Stephen Cox, Mysteries of
the Titanic, LIBERTY 24 (May 1997).
15. See ETHERINGTON-SMITH & PILCHER, supra note 14.
16. Cox, supra note 14 (describing hearings held to discover why so many
seats on Lucy Lady Duff-Gordon's lifeboat were empty).
17. Wood, 118 N.E. 214.
18. Harrison, Teaching from a Socioeconomic Perspective, supra note 9 at
1239-40.
19. Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the
Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195, 205 (2007) (summarizing work of Harvey Leiben-
stein and Thorsten Veblen on conspicuous consumption, and their conclusion that
238 [Vol. 28:235
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Lucy's endorsements were valuable because individuals are
willing to pay a premium for "brand name" goods (even when-
as in the Lucy Case-those goods are being selected and mar-
keted by someone outside the brand). Conspicuous consump-
tion based on brand name is designed to signal a person's
particular social class and the possession of material wealth.20
Lucy essentially chose to "cash in" on her fame by putting
her imprimatur of approval on mass-marketed goods. As Jef-
frey Harrison points out, consumers do not buy izod shirts sim-
ply because they are of good quality; they do so because to wear
such a brand name shirt serves a signaling function-that the
wearer can afford the shirt. 21 Lucy's fashions were coveted not
just for the designs themselves, but for the cache of being able
to afford one of her designs.
Social class, therefore, is present within the text of the
opinion, the background material that accompanies the opinion,
and the subject matter of the contract itself. All of these ele-
ments allow the instructor to introduce the topic of social class
into the classroom. Then, once the subject has been introduced,
the issue may be picked up as it becomes relevant, and also can
be tied into overarching questions about inequality in bargain-
ing power.
II. Social Class in the Contracts Course
After one begins to focus on the issue of social class, it rap-
idly becomes apparent that the class issues appear in many of
the cases commonly used to teach first year students contracts.
With a critical eye, one can find a great deal about socioeco-
nomic class in the pages of the typical contracts casebook.22 Al-
"price itself can be a source of utility" and that "[ilf people want to display their
wealth, they will actually derive more utility from the good the higher its price").
20. Kevin Sites, New York on a Million Dollars a Day, PEOPLE OF THE WEB,
Oct. 3, 2007, http://potw.news.yahoo.com/s/potw/45857/new-york-on-a-million-a-
day (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
21. Harrison, supra note 19.
22. In her well-known book, Mary Joe Frug looked carefully at what "stories"
the contracts casebook was telling about the social roles of women. See MARY JOE
FRUG, Postmodern Legal Feminism (1992). Since then, other commentators have
examined other casebooks for similar messages. See, e.g., Ann Althouse, The Lying
Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 914 (1994). The casebook that I have typically used to teach con-
tracts, Randy Barnett, Contracts: Cases and Doctrine, is focused almost exclusively
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though I cannot hope to be comprehensive in a brief essay,
below I discuss several of the "casebook classics" that present
social class issues: In re Baby M,23 Hamer v. Sidway,24 Vokes v.
Arthur Murray, Inc.,25 and Williams v. Walker Thomas Furni-
ture Co..26
Given that I use the Barnett book to teach contracts, the
issue of socioeconomic class is addressed at the start, in the
Baby M case.27 Carol Sanger has written about the ways in
which she uses this case to teach not just contracts that violate
public policy, but to hint at some of the "shadows" in the case,
including her admonition to the class that there are some items
that are simply not for sale, including sex and votes. 28 The
Baby M court itself warned of the issue of class, in stating that
"it is clear to us that it is unlikely that surrogate mothers will
be as proportionally numerous among those women in the top
twenty percent income bracket as among those in the bottom
twenty percent."29
In essence, the New Jersey Supreme Court was not only
concerned with the commodification of children and the use of
money in the adoption laws, but also the social class of the par-
ties involved. Examining the social position of the surrogate
mother, the court stated that "[at] the time of trial, the [surro-
gate's] net assets were probably negative ... [while the infertile
couple] are both professionals, she a medical doctor, he a bio-
chemist."30 This idea of taking advantage of a particular group
or class of women made the court pause in using the power of
on "casebook classics," the standard cases that are most often used to convey vari-
ous doctrinal points. RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (3d ed.
2003). With few notes to link the material together, the book allows the professor
to insert his or her own perspective and viewpoint on the cases.
23. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
24. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
25. 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
26. 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964).
27. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227.
28. Carol Sanger, (Baby) M is for the Many Things: Why I Start with Baby M,
44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1443, 1448 (Fall 2000).
29. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249. Interestingly, the court cites to Margaret
Radin, Market Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1849, 1930 (1987), in order to dis-
cuss this class division in surrogacy contracts.
30. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249.
240 [Vol. 28:235
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the state to enforce the surrogacy contract, and ultimately the
court refused to do so. 31
Socioeconomic status appears again in Hamer v. Sidway, a
casebook classic involving a nephew's promise to his uncle not
to smoke, drink or play cards.32 While the case is used to ex-
plain the doctrine of consideration, and whether forbearance
constitutes adequate consideration (after reading the case, we
find out that it does), there is also an intriguing class dimension
present in the facts. Uncle William notices his namesake
nephew, Willie, rapidly turning into a reprobate. 33 Uncle Wil-
liam promises to pay his nephew $5,000 if he gives up the hab-
its ruining his health and threatening his morals (the modern
day equivalent would be close to $100,000).34 Nephew Willie
carries through with his promise to abstain from such deleteri-
ous behaviors, but when it is time for Uncle William to pay, he
sends Nephew Willie a letter confirming his promise, yet push-
ing off his obligation to pay, a portion of which is excerpted
below:
I would hate very much to have you start out in some adventure
that you thought all right and lose this money in one year. The
first five thousand dollars that I got together cost me a heap of
hard work. You would hardly believe me when I tell you that to
obtain this I shoved a jack-plane many a day, butchered three or
four years, then came to this city, and, after three months' perse-
verance, I obtained a situation in a grocery store. I opened this
store early, closed late, slept in the fourth story of the building in
a room 30 by 40 feet, and not a human being in the building but
myself. All this I done to live as cheap as I could to save some-
thing. I don't want you to take up with this kind of fare. I was
here in the cholera season of '49 and '52, and the deaths averaged
80 to 125 daily and plenty of smallpox. I wanted to go home, but
Mr. Fisk, the gentleman I was working for, told me, if I left then,
after it got healthy he probably would not want me. I stayed. All
the money I have saved I know just how I got it. It did not come to
me in any mysterious way, and the reason I speak of this is that
31. Id.
32. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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money got in this way stops longer with a fellow that gets it with
hard knocks than it does when he finds it.35
Why is getting his nephew to abstain from alcohol and gam-
bling important enough to spend the modern day equivalent of
approximately $100,000? Uncle William essentially wants his
nephew to "change" his socio-economic class, or at least adopt
the mindset of a more frugal class background that (at least
from the tone of the letter) he is more comfortable and familiar
with. From a larger perspective, this opens up a larger ques-
tion. What do the students think about such a promise? How
do they feel about intrafamilial promises and donative transfers
of wealth?
Yet another case that raises issues of social class is the
casebook classic, Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc.36 The Vokes case
involves a fifty-one year old widow who begins to take dance
lessons.37 She continues signing up for lessons and competi-
tions over a period of time, apparently induced to do so by flat-
tery from her dance instructor. In the face of mounting bills
($30,000 in dance lessons), the widow attempts to avoid the con-
tract on the basis of misrepresentation, and the court allows her
to go forward with her case.38
The opinion is written in a style that is somewhat patroniz-
ing and, from time to time, patently condescending. The class
usually comes to the conclusion that the opinion was influenced
by a view of women, even wealthy older women, as being eco-
nomically helpless. I ask the class to imagine that the gender
had been reversed; if it had been a wealthy businessman who
had been sold thousands of hours of lessons, would the court
have been so willing to step in and protect him from his own
bargain? Why or why not? How much of the outcome of the
case involves the interplay of social class and gender roles?
Last, but by no means least, is the well-known case, Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 39 The case is typically
used to introduce the students to the doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity. The protagonist is a welfare mother who, because of the
35. Id.
36. Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914 (D.C. 1964).
242 [Vol. 28:235
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cash- and credit-strapped neighborhood in which she lives,
must purchase a stereo on extremely harsh terms, including a
cross-collateralization clause. 40 Many commentators have dis-
cussed the role that race, gender and social class play in this
opinion. 41 Another commentator has suggested that using the
case in the contracts class may serve to reinforce stereotypes
about African American women, women on welfare or women in
general, and suggests that professors use another case to teach
the doctrine. 42
I find this to be an intriguing debate, in part because I orig-
inally taught the Williams case as a beginning professor at
Cumberland Law School, located in Birmingham, Alabama.
Even though the case was (and is) controversial, I decided to
take a risk and to discuss it. The results were somewhat sur-
prising, given the controversial nature of race, racism and racial
identification in the southern United States, as the discussion
almost entirely ignored race and instead focused on social class.
The students seemed fixated with Williams' budgeting
skills (or lack thereof) and questioned her purchase of a stereo,
as opposed to a washing machine, kitchen appliances or other
household items that might be considered more "necessary" be-
cause of the presence of children in her family. One student in
particular attacked Williams' decision to sign the cross-collater-
alization clause, and emphasized that it was something that
"only poor people would do." In response to questioning from
me as well as other students in the class, it became clear that
the student who had volunteered that comment equated being
poor with being ignorant, and failing to read or understand
one's rights. In essence, only poor people would sign a cross-
collateralization clause. This was especially interesting be-
cause most people, not just people from a lower class back-
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in Discus-
sions of Contract Law, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 889 (1997) (discussing author's initial
"race blind" approach to the contracts course, and later realization that this was
impossible in light of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. and other cases);
Muriel Morisey Spence, Teaching Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 3 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 89 (1994); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Con-
tract, and Unconscionability, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994).
42. See AMY HILSMAN KASTELY, DEBORAH WAIRE POST, SHARON KANG HOM &
NANCY OTA, CONTACTING LAW (4th ed. 2006) (using a case other than Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. in order to not reinforce stereotypes).
9
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ground, fail to read form contracts. In fact, due to bounded
rationality, and the length of form contracts, in many instances
it does not make sense to read all of the fine print carefully. 43
Although the Williams case is in some senses hopelessly
controversial, in another sense it may be valuable to have a case
that does open the door to such an upfront discussion of social
class. In response to that student comment, many students
weighed in to say that the phenomenon of not reading fine print
is certainly not just something that "only poor people would do."
Other students took umbrage with the comment because it im-
plied that no one in law school had ever been poor-and these
were students who had come from homes where money was not
plentiful, and at the same time certainly were not ignorant.
Depending on the casebook that one uses, there are also
other cases and examples that one may use to engage the issue
of social class. One such case is Ricketts v. Scothorn,44 in which
a grandfather promises his granddaughter that he wants to
make her a gift so that she no longer has to work (again, impli-
cating class and gender roles in the early twentieth century).45
Another casebook example is found in Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. ,46
which involves the repudiation of an obligation to provide a pen-
sion (for a working class woman who had been employed with
the company for forty years). There are other ways of engaging
the issue beyond the doctrine, however. For example, Professor
Ian Ayres has written about the differential negotiating results
obtained when men and women of different races attempt to
buy cars, a fertile ground for discussion of gender, race and
class issues.47 Other commentators have written about trying
43. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruc-
tion, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (discussing how, despite a duty to read, very few
actually read the boilerplate in form contracts).
44. Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
45. Interestingly, many of these cases also involve gender-a woman protago-
nist who fits into a certain role or a certain class. These cases are interesting
because they illuminate the intersection of class and gender, and in the instance of
Williams u. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., they also implicate race issues as well.
46. Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
47. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF
RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001).
244 [Vol. 28:235
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss2/5
2008] EXPLORING (SOCIAL) CLASS IN CLASSROOM 245
to live on minimum wage, 48 or about the unconscionable clauses
that are sometimes including in payday loan contracts or in
terms of the financing offered to those serving in the armed
forces.49 All of these examples can be used to initiate the discus-
sion of social class; this initiation often leads students to think
about their own class backgrounds.
III. Social Class Among Law Students
Typically the question of "social class" or "social standing"
arise around the question of (relative) economic wealth. One
would think that the same indicia of wealth-and the American
focus on conspicuous consumption-that many of these types of
class differences run through different levels of school and can
be easily ascertained merely by looking at the designer clothes
that many students wear (perhaps another shadow of Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon's enduring fashion legacy). Another (very
non-scientific) survey of social class would involve a cursory
glance around the student parking lot. Many of these law
school class issues depend on whether one teaches at a state
sponsored law school, at a private law school, or the school's ge-
ographic location. Of course, the applicant pool and the subse-
quent admissions process are the most important factor in
determining the composition of the student body.
But perhaps the major "class" difference between those in
law school has little to do with economics. Rather the major
"class divide" is a question of whether the student has an attor-
ney-or perhaps more than one attorney-in his or her family.
Those students who come from "legal" backgrounds have signifi-
cant advantages. For example, students who come from legal
background come to law school as "informed consumers"-
knowing more about the costs, benefits and various areas of le-
gal practice as opposed to their peers. They may know which
areas of practice to avoid (ones that either result in less remu-
neration or perhaps the areas of practice that some would see as
more demanding or stressful). These students may also know
48. BARBARA ERENREICH, NICKLED AND DIMED (2002); Vara Neverow-Turk, Re-
searching the Minimum Wage: A Moral Economy for the Classroom, 42 COLL. COM-
POSITION & COMMC'N 477 (1991).
49. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1 (2002).
11
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which positions to seek out-such as judicial clerkships-be-
cause they are prestigious, even though they do not pay as well
as private practice-the investment in one's career is worth
more in the long term.
Further, the students from attorney families may have
their employment situations settled well before their matricula-
tion. Legal parents often have had a practice in need of a junior
attorney and they are eager to bring their child into the family
business. When I have encountered students who have these
opportunities, they have expressed that they are not particu-
larly concerned with their grades. Not having to worry about
finances, a job or grades are a significant advantage over their
peers, without even going into the advising and mentoring role
that a friend of the family can play in easing the transition into
law school and navigating the inevitable issues that come up
during one's time as a law student.
IV. Concluding Thoughts: Social Class in the Classroom
Social class may be an especially important subject to intro-
duce into the contracts course (as opposed to other first year
courses) for two reasons. First, contracts, more than other
courses (with perhaps the notable exception of property) con-
cerns exchanges and monetary transactions explicitly. Money,
consideration, value, deals and bargaining are part of the stan-
dard language of "contracts talk." Second, the fact that con-
tracts may be a fairly rigid doctrine in policing existing
divisions can mean that it is even more vital to raise questions
of social class in the contracts course rather than anywhere
else.
On a more concrete level, thinking about social class en-
sures that we strive for the best in the provision of legal educa-
tion. Are we giving examples that seem to fit the background of
a certain group? Are we keeping in mind that students come
from a variety of racial, ethnic and class backgrounds? Are we
being sensitive to the fact that many students are constrained
in the types of work and areas of law that they may practice?50
50. See Dorothy E. Finnegan, Raising and Leveling the Bar: Standards, Ac-
cess, and the YMCA Evening Law Schools, 1890-1940, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 208
246 [Vol. 28:235
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss2/5
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All of these are questions that we should try to answer, as we
try to provide a legal education that is available and accessible
to students of diverse backgrounds.
(2005) (describing effort of evening law schools to democratize the legal
profession).
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